INTRODUCTION
This paper examines TiVo in Australia. The theoretical framework, which gives structure and direction to the analysis here, is the cultural economy of media and communications -a variation on the more traditional political economy of the media approach. A political economy approach is well-established in the study of traditional media, where it has yielded an abundant and insightful research literature with a critical focus upon the economic interests and the political environment in which technological development and commercialisation shape media development. While related to political economy, in this paper we position the notion of 'cultural economy' as a preferable term to more established ideas of 'political economy' on the basis that cultural economy research focuses specifically on how 'discourse and cultural practice constitute the spaces within which economic action is formatted and framed' (CRESC 2010; see also, du Gay and Pryke 2002a) .
In addition to taking account of social and discursive contexts in which economic action proceeds, this perspective is also well equipped to account for the technical contexts or milieus in which media cultures are assembled (Bennett and Healy 2009; Goggin 2009) . A cultural economic approach, Goggin (2011, 38) points out, is 'worth pursuing precisely because of the heightened role that culture plays in contemporary economies'. As Goggin observes, 'the importance of cultural economy has grown rapidly in the past decade, especially with developments in globalisation, and digital cultures and forms play a significant role in this' (Goggin 2011, 38 ). What it offers, then, is 'a way to bring together central questions about digital technologies and cultures -especially to do with the role of use and the new role consumption and creativity is believed to have in new media' (Goggin 2011, 
DIGITAL TV AND FREE-TO-AIR NETWORKS
In the current digital environment, there are a growing set of technical options for the distribution and viewing of TV content, including cable and pay TV, DVDs, Internet Protocol Television (IPTV) hardware, and Internet Television software offering on-demand TV programs, online file-sharing, and Internet video streaming (Meikle and Young 2008) . These technologies not only challenge the dominance of a traditional broadcast regime and the business models of free-to-air networks, but also, as Bruns (2008) argues, undermine the very significance of broadcast television. In comparison to an Internet-based video distribution and transmission model, broadcast TV is a limited medium insofar as it requires the addition of other bits of hardware in order to retain its appeal in a changing cultural economy, and, as we shall see, TiVo has been cast in an important role in achieving this, if not through capturing marketing share itself, then through its capacity as a leading edge technology, to model some of the functionality that threatens the broadcast model. TV, as Bruns writes, from network to networked television (Palmer 2006 ; for detailed discussion, see Bennett and Strange 2010; Tay and Turner 2008; Ross 2008; Kenyon 2007; Olsson and Spigel 2004; Poniewozik 2009 ). This literature addresses both the political economy of the TV industry, as well as changes to the experience of television for audiences (eg. Barkhuus and Brown 2008; Chorianopoulos and Spinellis 2007) . Terry Flew (2005, 2) , for example, has noted that Internet TV is 'an instance of qualitatively "new" media, not so much because it changes the form, but because it changes the means of distribution and storage, and the associated business models, of those media'. In this media ecology, control of content has shifted from a provider 'push', to a consumer 'pull' model, in that the viewing of content is more customised and personalised. Whilst it is important to acknowledge that television has never been a passive medium, our relationship to the control of TV content is undergoing significant change from one that was relatively 'lean-back' to one that is relatively 'lean-forward'.
Traditionally, free-to-air television has held a significant place in the cultural, economic, and political landscape of Australia. As Jock Given (2003) has noted, broadcast media is 'something special' requiring little in investment in terms of literacy or ongoing costs. In Australia, broadcasting was historically free to viewers. The economics of free-to-air TV did not require a dollar payment flowing from viewers to broadcasters, but required an in-kind payment from viewers, in the form of accepting exposure to advertising. This exposure was then on-sold by the broadcasters to the advertiser. This model meant that TV was almost universal in its availability (Kenyon and Wright 2006) as it emerged from the mid-20th century as a national mass medium. Now, digital technology supports a variety of delivery formats and services, especially through Internet TV and streaming content to viewers, which allow viewers to bypass broadcasters and access content more directly or in more personalised ways ( Kenyon and Wright 2006 ) -whether via authorised or unauthorised sources (such as iTunes and iView, or Hulu and BitTorrent). These services, which cater to individual viewing preferences, challenge a whole range of received or accepted TV norms, such as the aesthetic of 'liveness' and the shared experience of viewing (Bourdon 2000; see also, Morley 1986; Spigel 1992; 2001) , as well as the TV viewing environment, which is increasingly built around timeshifting technologies (Meikle and Young 2008) . Nevertheless, TV histories suggest that the cultural, political and institutional inertia of free-to-air television is considerable, and unlikely to be replaced, although analyses suggest its significance will likely be displaced (Kenyon and Wright 2006; Meikle and Young 2008) .
The television industry in Australia is acutely aware of this shifting terrain, as evidenced by moves by 'many media corporations in Australia and elsewhere [who] have increasingly hedged their bets by diversifying beyond television and investing in a variety of Internet and other digital enterprises' (Bruns 2008, 93) .
Two further sets of responses are discernible. On the one hand, networks have been slow to take-up opportunities and make the transition from analogue to digital TV in Australiaalthough this has changed in recent times as a result of the work of the Freeview consortium, to be discussed in greater detail below, which aims to provide a consistent and united digital platform to accompany the expansion of digital multi-channels and to compete against alternative digital content delivery. Freeview may only offer limited digital and on-demand capacities, yet appears to be garnering enthusiasm from networks and audiences, with a 25% rise in free-to-air digital television conversion and a 93% awareness of the Freeview brand (ThinkTV 2010a). Typically, free-to-air networks' past reluctance to invest in digital multichannels has been attributed to uncertainty about audience fragmentation and advertising revenues, as well as a slow uptake of digital receivers by consumers and the Government's indecision and delay in setting a date to switch-off the analogue system (Idato 2009; Mann and Bernsteins 2007) . On the other hand, networks attempt to maintain some semblance of control of, or determination in, the ways content is distributed, transmitted, and viewed. They seem particularly concerned about the effects of recording and time-shifting of digital television content, especially in ways that enable advertising to be avoided, the impact of streaming and online distribution for traditional models, and the overall place of television in Australian culture (Wright et al. 2007) . Clearly the divestment of control over media content selection and modes of consumption from broadcaster to consumer is recognised as a key feature of the current cultural economy, but it is also seen to be an economic threat to the commercial free-to-air business model. If, for example, advertisements are skipped using a digital video recorder or other service such as TiVo; or, if viewers shift to watching content distributed online, whether through peer-to-peer networks or from online distributors of aggregated content, via Internet TV (Wright et al. 2007; Green 2008) , free-to-air loses its source of revenue. In this sense the challenge facing networks and both established and emerging technologies is not purely cultural, but also economic.
Viewers -that is, cultural consumers of domestic media content -are increasingly aware of alternative platforms and offerings; in this regard, it is notable that Australians reportedly have the highest per capita downloading rate for television programs (Pesce 2005 , cited in Kenyon and Wright 2006) . There is clearly a sense that broadcasters are not providing the options viewers want, with the latter being aware of alternative content and distribution avenues. Evident here are 'new cultural practices and relationships' (Goggin 2011, 39) which pose challenges to the 'kinds of systems -economies -that construct our relationships with, around, and through cultur [al] forms', such as television. In order to remain relevant, media companies and technologies must respond to shifts in cultural patterns and habits of viewing. The terrain has shifted, and the horizon of consumer possibility has expanded. In this context it is no longer possible to adhere to traditional models. In cultural terms, technologies that mediate the expression of personal agency in relation to media consumption need to be embraced, and need to be seen to be embraced by free-to-air television, yet in economic terms, the performance of this agency can't be allowed to extend to the consumption (or not) of advertising. This threat to free-to-air television advertising revenues is clearly serious, and follows only a little behind a similar threat that has perhaps fatally undermined the business model of newspapers. The contradictions evident in this situation make for an unstable cultural economy, and compound the instability that flows from fierce competition among alternative hardware platforms, software protocols and delivery modes.
Characterising this complex digital and free-to-air TV environmental milieu, then, are shifting distribution channels, business models, regulatory approaches, television geographies, user expectations, and cultural habits. Within this milieu, it can be argued that TiVo is a critical and exemplary technical actor for mediating the ways TV is being reshaped, but also for illuminating the limits and challenges all technologies face in a convergent environment. The critical difference that TiVo makes to the cultural economy of media consumption is evident in the difference between the affordances 1 of digital personal recording devices and free-to-air television. The affordances of PVRs include time-shifted viewing of free-to-air content, on demand viewing of content from other sources, ad skipping, semi-automated recording, and the deployment of 'recommender' algorithms to advise on content. The cultural economics of this may be represented by an equation in which time and the attention of the audience is a relatively scarce resource, in which the content competing for that time and attention is plentiful, and in which decision making about content consumption has devolved from programming managers to consumers. PVRs offer a value proposition in the cultural zeitgeist represented by this equation by offering efficient decision making with respect to the selection and acquisition of content, and offering flexible time options for the consumption of that content.
With this as crucial context to our discussion, we now chart the early development of TiVo in a North American context, before turning to an examination of its place in the Australian market.
TIVO AND THE US EXPERIENCE: FROM 'FOUR-LETTER WORD', TO INDUSTRY LEADER, TO ONE OF MANY
The TiVo DVR was designed in 1997 by Mike Ramsay and Jim Barton, former Silicon Graphics Inc. executives who were working on a home network device before adapting it into a hard-disk recorder that digitised analogue signals (antenna, cable, or direct broadcast satellite). They founded TiVo Inc. in 1999, and launched the TiVo PVR at the National TELECOMMUNICATIONS JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA, VOLUME 61, NUMBER 4, 2011 SWINBURNE UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY
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Consumer Electronics Show in Las Vegas. At the same show, ReplayTV introduced their rival DVR.
It is worth noting the quite specific home media context that TiVo was entering, which is quite different from what consumers experience (and perhaps expect) today. Back in 1997, broadband was less common, and the idea of streaming video and other media content was still something of a pipedream. Not only were there few if any 'legitimate' services for downloaded content, but the pirate networks that did exist struggled to cope with the size of music files, let alone video. In short, then, TiVo held the promise of filling a particular market gap, and was ahead of its competitors in this respect.
Understandably, around the time of their first release in the US, these time-shift technologies were met with a great deal of industry resistance due to their ad-skipping capabilities, and concerns about their impact on broadcaster's revenues -concerns that were widely reported in the trade and mainstream press. 'The reaction of the advertising industry was less than hospitable: " [D] VR is fast becoming a four-letter word in some advertising and media circles"' (Forkan 2000 , 18, cited in Carlson 2006 . The technologies were exploiting an inherent and perhaps fatal weakness in the free-to-air model. That is, where most businesses seek to meet a demand in the market place (or to create that demand and then meet it), free-toair is utterly dependent for its revenue on providing a service (advertising) that no endconsumers demand, few consumers desire, and many actively resist. It has been argued that the ad-skipping function that has made TiVo famous threatens the whole economic model of broadcasting itself (Boullier and Huet 2008 ). Yet, it was ReplayTV's more radical automatic ad-skip feature that drew more attention and a lawsuit for alleged copyright infringement; 'The ReplayTV example shows how existing firms were able to stifle developments deemed too radical or threatening' (Carlson 2006, 109) .
TiVo, for its part, was much more circumspect, deciding not to implement automatic adskipping, and thus successfully avoided much backlash from the television industry. Instead of seeking an alliance with consumers seeking to avoid advertising, it formed alliances with product manufacturers, and with satellite and cable providers, such as DirecTV, allowing integration with other set-top boxes and with subscription services. These provided a strategic advantage in the early stages of industry development (Chorianopoulos and Spinellis 2007; Yoffie and Slind 2007) and assisted in mass distribution. From there, TiVo's success owes much to its relationships with networks and advertisers as business partners instead of adversaries. By 1999, TiVo counted NBC, CBS, Discovery, and Comcast, among its major investors (Carlson 2006) . While TiVo remains an independent company, Time Warner, DirecTV, Discovery Networks, NBC, and Sony, owned over 40 percent in 2003 (Lieberman 2003 , cited in Carlson 2006 . As Carlson (2006) notes, TiVo's economic and industry alliances meant that rather than operating as an external threat to broadcasting regimes, it was to some extent incorporated into them, 'preventing the technology from moving too quickly in a direction that would severely threaten existing revenues' (Carlson 2006, 107 ) -as we show was repeated in the case with Seven Media Group in Australia. For their part, advertisers initially responded to the development and growing popularity of TiVo by trying to 'TiVoproof' their messages, and by resorting to measures such a product placement within TV shows and making shorter or non-standard length commercials (Yoffie and Slind 2007) .
In the US, TiVo quickly become a household name, synonymous with (and often a verb for) TV recording: 'TiVo' entered the popular lexicon as people spoke of 'TiVo-ing' their favourite shows. As a company, TiVo Inc. popularised PVRs, and dominated the PVR market. As a device, TiVo stood out for its simple user interface and for its novel proprietary features. However, in the US, as DVRs have gained steadily in popularity and the number of PVR models have grown, with generic versions offered by satellite and cable companies, the popularity of TiVo has declined, from a high of over 4 million in 2006 to below 3 million in 2009 (Gorman 2008) . Thus, TiVo has played a critical role in reshaping television from a linear medium, in which viewers had no choice but to watch whatever programming broadcasters transmitted, to one characterised by intensified time-shifting practices, but its success has also contributed to a digital milieu that challenges its past dominance.
To compensate, and remain relevant, Tom Rogers, President and CEO of TiVo Inc., argues that, in the context of broadband-TV convergence, the TiVo has evolved: it has become a kind of computer, complete with software, and a hard drive (Yoffie and Slind 2007) . Thus, with a broadband connection, owners can use it to access a wide array of video content and interactive services. The company has entered into agreements with online companies to provide broadband content. In the US, for example, TiVo now supports streaming rented content via Netflix, purchasing of video via Amazon's Video on Demand service, and music via online music service Rhapsody (Yoffie and Slind 2007) . As Rogers puts it, with TiVo,
We are in multiple businesses. We are a consumer electronics company. We are in the cable/satellite distribution business. We are in the software development business, and we're in the intellectual property licensing business. We are in the advertising solutions business. We are in the audience research business. And we are pursuing international business. And each one of those has a whole different set of players attached to them. (Tim Rogers Interview in Yoffie and Slind 2007) In this way, we can see how the TiVo brand has reinvented itself in the US from a maker of DVRs, to something that is much more diversified than this, and which strives to be much more competitive in an era of convergent communications. TiVo has persistently tried to differentiate itself from others in the market, to define itself and its affordances and capacities through advertising, yet this definition has shifted over time. Like the early telephone, which in its first decade was represented as a broadcasting device, a business communications device, an emergency response device, a domestic communications device, and a party-line device before stabilising as a personal communications device (Marvin 1988) , so TiVo has had difficulty settling on a stable identity -or, more accurately, redefining itself in relation to shifting socio-technical contexts. In the UK, TiVo initially advertised the ability to 'pause' live TV; following poor sales it changed the tag-line to 'a VCR without tapes' (Wood and Skrebowski 2004) . Later, in the US, it tried to distinguish itself through ad campaigns organised around catchphrases like, 'I'm not interested in the generic PVR. I want the TiVo experience' and 'My TiVo Gets Me' (Elliot 2007). Launched in 2007, these ad campaigns tried to highlight TiVo's intelligent design features. Later, TiVo used the motto 'one remote, one box, one user interface, all content' (Boullier and Huet 2008) , to emphasise broadband content delivery, such as video-on-demand (VoD) services.
What we can see in the US case, is a product, once synonymous with TV recording, and now one of many generic PVR devices and content aggregators, that has had to work harder to stand out (Yao 2010 ). The US case also highlights the importance of corporate creativity and adaptability within cultural economic systems especially in 'the creation of economic value' (Goggin 2011, 38) .
THE QUIET REVOLUTION OR BUSINESS AS USUAL? TIVO IN AUSTRALIA
In July 2008, TiVo technology was brought to Australia by Hybrid Television Services (ANZ) Pty Limited. The licence for TiVo products in Australia and New Zealand is held by Hybrid Television Services (hereafter shortened to Hybrid TV), who in turn are owned by the Seven Media Group (Australia) and TVNZ (New Zealand).
To preface this tale, it is important to recognise that the decade that has elapsed between TiVo's US introduction has meant that, upon its Australian arrival, TiVo met a very different media market than it did when it was launched in the US in 1997. As we shall see below, in coming here, TiVo entered a more mature home digital television market with users having a number of options for timeshifting -options that were not available to US consumers in the late 1990s. In short, in Australia, TiVo has had to contend and compete with a wider existing set of industry competitors.
Before its arrival in Australia, a small community of enthusiasts imported TiVo DVRs, and, hacking the Linux open source operating system, reverse-engineered the TiVo hardware and data protocols of the electronic program guides. This was unofficially tolerated at the time by TiVo Inc. (Mann and Bernsteins 2007; Toomey et al. 2004) , until its official release. Since its TELECOMMUNICATIONS JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA, VOLUME 61, NUMBER 4, 2011 SWINBURNE UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY 61.6 _____ release, the series 3 version of the TiVo DVR available in Australia has had digital rights management (DRM) software installed with all data on the hard disk encrypted to prevent any copyright infringements.
Prior to its impending Australian release, there was uncertainty in the popular media about what functionality and service models it would include, especially around the ad-skipping capability and subscription fees. It is understood that talks between Seven Media Group and the US-based TiVo Inc. broke down when the parent company requested the device be sold as part of a monthly subscription package, just like Foxtel. Seven rejected this, claiming that the fewer than 20 channels (including HD versions) offered by free-to-air TV wouldn't be able to compete with Foxtel's 100+ pay TV channels (and iQ box). A compromise was reached, with Seven agreeing to pay TiVo Inc. a royalty for each TiVo box sold (Moses 2008) . Thus, without the subscription component, TiVo's Australian revenue model is based on sales of the box (retailing initially for $699), plus the add-on of its VoD service.
The device itself was launched in Australia in July 2008 by David Leckie, the Chief Executive Officer of Seven Media Group, and Tom Rogers, President and CEO of TiVo Inc. to much hype. Expressly linking free-to-air broadcasting with the newly emerging cultural economy of digital media consumption, Leckie declared that, 'TiVo's arrival in Australia further strengthens free-to-air television in Australia … it's about us meeting new consumer demands for more control, more services and more involvement in the television experience' and that 'TiVo will play a key role in the future of free-to-air television in Australia' by 'introducing the technology and the broader multi-channel platform that will redefine television in this country' (Seven Media Group 2008).
Primarily, however, it was launched in Australia with only basic DVR functionality (Neiger 2008) . The home networking functionality and the ability to transfer and load recorded shows to a portable device were absent at launch, as were broadband and VoD services afforded by the TiVo's Internet connection, such as movie and music download stores. In short, it was launched as a smart PVR with the promise of Internet and networked services to come. In December 2009, Hybrid TV launched its proprietary content and service platform, CASPA On-Demand; on-demand movies were launched in April 2009.
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In general, the roll-out of TiVo in this country has encountered far less controversy than in the US, but also far less enthusiasm. Aware of the US history of the device, and in order to allay many of the content industry concerns, and given their own free-to-air television and advertising interests, rather than cannibalise its revenue by supporting a product that allowed people to skip ads, many key features present in the US TiVo were disabled by Hybrid TV and their owners. The device is allied with the interests of free-to-air broadcasters, and with the interpolation of the consumer as a consumer of free-to-air content, including advertising, and is not allied with the interests of consumer control over content consumption, inclusive of advertising. Consumption is empowered by the device, but only where that does not cut across the interests of the broadcaster.
TIVO AND FREEVIEW IN AUSTRALIA
In the absence of regulatory intervention to stop the sale of time-shift viewing technologies or to support DRM systems (Kenyon and Wright 2006) , broadcasters in Australia have pursued alternative avenues. These de facto solutions, as Bosland et al. (2010) describe them, involve efforts to use intellectual property to limit other's use of that content -particularly manufacturers' incorporation of ad-skipping features in Australian PVRs. The free-to-air EPG, administered by the Freeview consortium -a collaboration between the public and commercial broadcasters -is not only a common marketing platform, and an aggregated online catch-up TV service for free TV network content, but also a branding exercise used to influence DVR equipment manufacturers (Bosland et al. 2010) . Freeview endorsed DVR equipment is labelled with the 'Freeview EPG' logo to inform viewers that only this equipment will have access to the new Freeview EPG -although the Freeview-endorsed TiVo extracts Content Reference Indicator (CRID) data embedded in the broadcast signal to update its own EPG. Also, the EPG is only provided to DVR equipment if manufacturers remove features such as the ability to skip the advertisements. So, for example, as the TiVo is controlled in Australia by Seven Media Group, one of Australia's largest free-to-air broadcasters, the EPG is limited to recording free to air television. Their corporate owners, Seven Media Group, adapted TiVo to a local Australasian market by disabling the adskipping function, although users can still fast forward through ads at 30x speeds.
What the above historical sequence of events and technical developments point towards is a tension between the strategies of the US-based TiVo Inc., and those of its Australian licensee, Hybrid TV, and its parent company, Seven Media Group. On the one hand, much of TiVo Inc.'s business operations have been geared towards remaining as relevant as possible as key shifts to a digital television milieu are taking place, primarily by developing technologies (like the continually evolving TiVo device) that are geared towards individual consumer viewing practices and habits, and providing for their more participatory role in networked TV culture. Yet, on the other hand, in Australia, Hybrid TV and Seven Media Group have limited the functionality of the device and delayed many features in order, it would seem, to try and keep their audiences within a broadcast regime, if in ways that permit a somewhat less linear or scheduled format. These moves, which could be seen as an attempt to stem the migration of free-to-air viewers to pay TV, can also be viewed as being in direct competition with other PVRs, with cable subscription TV (Foxtel), and with VoD and Internet TV.
TiVo has struggled to obtain the degree of market share in Australia that it enjoyed at one point in the US. There are a number of clear reasons for this. When launched in Australia, the TiVo was no longer cutting edge technology. It faced competition from other PVR devices, and was slow to the table. Moreover, 'digital TV has also languished behind the pay TV platform Foxtel, which converted its service to digital in 2004 and controls the market leading PVR, the IQ, which has sold more than 540,000 units since 2005. The free-to-air equivalent, the Seven-owned TiVo, has sold only 40,000 since 2008' (Idato 2009 ) -statistics which paint a rather bleak outlook for TiVo in Australia according to some pundits (Turner 2011 ).
THE TIVO DEVICE AND 'TIMESHIFT' CULTURES
What distinguishes the TiVo from many other PVRs is software written by TiVo Inc. that offers more 'intelligent' recording and storage facilities. These include the capacity to pause, rewind, and replay live TV; but also, by recommending or automatically recording programs based on monitoring of viewing habits and user ratings (TiVo ® Suggestions); or automatically deleting oldest recordings, (unless marked for keeping), making room for newly recorded content. Thus, the TiVo software and an associated electronic program guide provide a high level of user functionality and customisability.
More recent TiVo DVRs can be connected to a computer local area network, which allows users to schedule recordings on TiVo's website (via TiVo Central Online), and remotely (TiVo Genie Online); to transfer recordings between TiVo units (Multi-Room Viewing (MRV) or home computers (TiVoToGo transfers); to play music and view photos over the network; and to develop or use third-party applications written using TiVo's Home Media Engine (HME) platform.
The TiVo has thus become a more convergent home media device, which offers functionality beyond standard DVRs, such as remote programming, access to broadband applications and games, and access to online content or video-on-demand (VoD). In the US, as discussed above, TiVo has also added a number of broadband features, including integration with Amazon Video on Demand, and Netflix offering users access to movie titles and TV shows, as well as access to streaming online music through Rhapsody. In Australia, broadband access to VoD is available through the CASPA On-Demand service; CASPA (Content And Services Platform Asia) was one of the first on-demand IPTV services, and is currently available only via the TiVo media device.
Clearly, TiVo has contributed to shifts in viewing habits and practices and to new ways of watching content, through functions that allow viewers to time-shift, and break from the logic of linear broadcast viewing. PVR penetration is rising rapidly (Hamburger 2010) , and research shows that PVR and TiVo users increase their viewing time and watch more television than those without (Boullier and Huet 2008; Carlson 2006; McIntyre 2007) . Yet, data consistently shows that PVR users time-shift much of their content to watch recorded programs at a preferred time -figures vary somewhere between 30 per cent and 40 per cent (Boullier and Huet 2008; Nielsen 2009 ). Further, data suggests that the majority of usersestimates range between 50 per cent and 70 per cent (Boullier and Huet 2008; Nielsen 2009 
CONCLUSIONS: TIVO'S FUTURE IN A CONVERGENT DIGITAL ERA
Early in TiVo's US history, its core challenge was to convey to consumers a clear sense of what a PVR was, and why they should want one. Later, it faced challenges from competing PVR models and so tried to promote TiVo as superior -a more sophisticated and userfriendly PVR. Today, TiVo tries to sell itself as a multi-functional media device. This may prove increasingly challenging however, as TiVo now faces competition from a wide range of other actors: not only from PVR service providers, but from an explosion of online distribution platforms delivering content, and an increasing number of devices and services, as well as the blurring of TV and Internet.
This convergent context is one that is increasingly competitive, and one in which the competition and challenge to TiVo is occurring on multiple fronts: PVR and IPTV hardware manufacturers, online content providers, and other integrated services (e.g., Foxtel IQ; Telstra T-hub). TiVo must stand-out through functionality, usability, and cost. In terms of Internet TV and IPTV, broadcast and VoD services compete with other organisations and partnerships involving content providers and online platforms, VoD, streaming, and peer-to-peer (p2p) networks. To remain relevant, then, the TiVo and Hybrid TV must either offer content unavailable elsewhere (unlikely), or offer a wider range of content access than other platforms, to record streaming content for example (something also unlikely when given they are owned by a broadcaster).
In this period of change and uncertainty, TiVo Inc. is attempting to shore up its relevance, straddling pre-and post-broadest arrangements, allowing recording and time-shifting, but also trying to provide access to VoD or streaming digital content. The problem is, they are operating within a rapidly shifting digital economy with a complex milieu consisting of digital convergence, and multiple platforms, devices, and services. What is more, increasing numbers of gaming consoles, flat-screen TVs, and personal video recorders are broadbandenabled, and new devices capable of downloading and screening paid video content will be released onto the market in the coming years (Lobato 2009 ).
Whilst this environment has generated a range of responses (from litigation, IP, collaboration, and investment -see Carlson 2006) , the conventional assumption in the television industry that re-use, such as file-sharing of content, is a threat to the traditional broadcaster business model, is not fully supported. Bruns (2008) argues that evidence suggests piracy and p2p distribution increases audiences and sales. Similarly, the assumption that widespread diffusion of PVR technology threatens television advertising models fails to acknowledge longstanding and widespread practices of 'ad-skipping' or avoidance, such as leaving the room, channel surfing, and so on (Notkin 2006) . Moreover, this same assumption fails to acknowledge the emergence of new revenue streams or models from new technologies (Hamburger 2010) . As shown in the Sony decision from the 1980s, the VCR was initially seen as a threat to copyright and the economic models of broadcasters, but was later supported and justified for making possible the home video market (von Lohmann 2008).
In the digital context there are revenue possibilities in streaming content and VoD (von Lohmann 2008), something TiVo has sought to do. But, even more productive has been to realise the potential uses of the technology for data collection of viewing habits and the value of this data to advertisers and networks (e.g. target marketing) (Carlson 2006; Yoffie and Slind 2007) . This data gives the advertisers more accurate information on the reach of their advertising, and thus provides the potential for more effective advertising. And yet, the TiVo has received condemnation in the popular press for being an outdated and expensive PVR, a technology that is increasingly irrelevant in the contexts of digital distribution and online streaming TV, and emerging streaming models such as Hulu; yet it continues to strive to change and adapt to digital circumstances.
This article has taken a cultural economic approach to examining the development of TiVo, and its arrival and reception in Australia. The usefulness of this approach is twofold. On the one hand, a cultural economic approach suggests that, with respect to culture, it is the 'nature, character and operation of its relationship with other entities -be they social, natural, economic, or technical -that is at stake' (Bennett et al. 2008, 2) . And so the story of TiVo, in this first sense, is a story of alliances. On the other hand, and at the same time, this approach draws attention to 'the ways in which the 'making up' or 'construction' of economic realities is undertaken and achieved' (du Gay & Pryke 2002b, 5) . And so, in this second sense, the story of TiVo's alliances is a story about economics. The value of this theoretical framework to the present study is that it focuses attention on, and helps to clarify, the complex interrelationships that mutually define TiVo, and the new business models, economic pressures, and technical factors, that emerge around and structure them and their diverse cultures of consumption. That is to say, with its focus on the 'heightened role that culture plays in contemporary economies' (Goggin 2011, 38) , it speaks to, and helps shed light on, new cultural forms and characteristics emerging around the media consumption practices of domestic television consumers, adaptations to industry systems -and attendant economiesin response to these shifts, and the systems of (economic and symbolic) value arising from both. What this study has revealed is that TiVo has arrived in Australia at a critical juncture in the history (and future) of free-to-air broadcast television in this country. Whether Hybrid TV (in conjunction with Freeview) are successful in leveraging TiVo as part of their attempts to shore up free-to-air TV in a shifting digital milieu in Australia is something that remains to be seen, and provides a unique window on the changing cultural economy of media production, distribution and consumption.
